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Carbon Emission Control Policies within China’s Power Generation Sector
Abstract
Abstract: The paper examines the potential for emissions control policy
using the example of the power generation sector in China. The analytical
model is developed using a joint production function, where carbon
emissions and electricity are jointly produced using capital and fossil fuel
inputs. Abatement of emissions can be achieved by investment in two types
of capital – production capital that improves the production efficiency, or
abatement capital that removes the emissions. The analytical model shows
that economic growth can be achieved while still keeping the emission
stock at a stable level. The results are estimated using data from China’s
electricity generation sector. The results show that the level of the tax
required to stabilize emissions depends greatly on the efficiency of
abatement activities. As an illustration of this result, one finding shows that
the required emission tax would be reduced greatly from 16 to 5 yuan per
ton of emission when the abatement technology is improved from
removing 10% to 30% of emissions flow.
Keywords: electricity generation, carbon emissions, carbon taxes, joint
production, China
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Carbon Emission Control Within the Power Generation of China

1. Introduction
Over the past several decades developed countries have generally experienced mild
economic growth while many developing countries have experienced rapid economic
growth. For example, in 2007 per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 11.4
percent in China (China Statistical Yearbook 2008)1 and 9.2 percent in India2 , while the
United States and Japan had growth rates of 3.2 and 2.0 percent. Even under the global
financial crisis, the real growth rate in 2008 was about 9 percent for China and 7.4
percent for India respectively.3 Economic growth increases national wealth, but can also
lead to environmental problems when production activities rely on non-renewable and
pollution generating natural resources such as coal and petroleum. This issue is of
immediate importance, as nations are trying to develop an international agreement that
will effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions while still allowing a reasonable level
of pollution generation that will allow developing nations to improve their standard of
living. Research that jointly models economic growth and environmental quality is
informative in determining how developing countries may be impacted by emission
restrictions. The question of whether economic growth is compatible with environmental
protection has received great attention in the economic literature, and conclusions vary
greatly.

1

http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm
http://www.indexmundi.com/india/gdp_real_growth_rate.html
3
The real growth rate is -0.7 percent in Japan and 1.1 percent in US (source: CIA world fact book as of
January 1, 2009)
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Some find that sustainable growth can be achieved under certain conditions. With
an endogenous growth model, Romer (1986) suggests that the accumulation of human
capital is the driving force that makes sustainable growth feasible in the presence of
environmental concern. Using an amended Green Solow model, Brock and Taylor (2004)
find that the balanced growth is achievable as long as technological progress in pollution
abatement is greater than the growth of production. Hartman and Kwon (2005) find that
the sustainable growth is optimal when human (clean) capital grows more rapidly than
physical (dirty) capital for private goods production. Economides and Philippoppoulos
(2008) study the Ramsey second-best policy in a general equilibrium setting and find that
the revenue of the ‘right’ tax and subsidy facilitate the sustainable use of natural resource.
Others suggest that continuous growth will lead to environmental deterioration and
that environmental improvement can only be achieved at the cost of slowing down the
economic growth. The typical Ramsey problem is applied to an economy where pollution
is a disutility factor, and consumers maximize utility by choosing the level of investment,
consumption and abatement activities. A seminal paper using this framework is Forster
(1973), whose research was extended by Gruver (1976), Van der Ploeg and Withagen
(1991), and many others. The main conclusion from these papers is that concern about
environmental quality will lead to a lower growth rate, because physical capital allocated
for pollution abatement crowds out investment in production for desired goods.
This paper addresses the question of whether economic development is
compatible with carbon emissions control. Carbon emissions are different from other air
pollutants in several aspects: (i) the flow of carbon emissions do not impose immediate
harm to the public, but has a global impact via climate change; (ii) carbon emissions are
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generated from rapid industrialization, involving nations at all different level of economic
development; (iii) the threshold level of carbon emissions is uncertain, and the cost of
emissions control may be very high. A first-best solution for carbon emissions control
requires international collaboration and careful examination of the trade off between
environmental gain from regulation and economic cost of emissions control. The Kyoto
Protocol is currently the primary current international agreement on greenhouse gas
emissions control. It has been successful in raising awareness of climate change and
providing the public with comprehensive scientific reports on global climate change and
its connection with human anthropogenic activity. However, limited progress on further
mitigation of global carbon emissions has been achieved under Kyoto, primarily because
some of the major emitters (including the U.S. and China) disagree on the timetable of
emissions control and have not agreed to any level of emissions reduction as of 2009.
This study examines the potential for emissions control within one major source
of carbon emissions, China’s power generation sector. China has been the biggest emitter
of greenhouse gases in the world since 2006 (Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency 2007),4 and its power generation sector accounts for the majority of its carbon
emissions. In 2006, China emitted 6.103 trillion metric tons of CO2, while the United
States emitted 5.975 trillion of metric tons of CO2, about 21.5 and 20.2 percent of global
emissions, respectively (United Nation Millennium Development Goals Indicator
database).5 Chinese power generation accounts for 54% of its national carbon emissions,
while power generation worldwide accounts for 37% of energy related carbon dioxide

4

Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency: http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/index.html.
United Nation: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/air_co2_emissions.htm.
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and 27% of all carbon emissions (Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change, 2007,
Washington Post, 20086).
Our study here is relevant to two important cases – the first case where China
develops emissions control policy in the absence of any binding international agreement,
and the second case where a binding international agreement exists and each nation has
autonomy to reach its own emissions reduction target in the most cost-effective manner.
Due to its large percentage of global carbon emissions, searching for feasible emission
control instruments in China is extremely important in controlling global emissions.
Recent negotiations in Copenhagen, Denmark included a proposal from China to reduce
its carbon intensity by 40-45% of 2005 levels in 2020 (BBC, 2009).7 Carbon intensity,
China's preferred measurement, is the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of GDP.
In this paper, we focus on examining appropriate policies that provide firms the
incentive to achieve a social goal of emissions control. In most previous studies,
theoretical modeling and empirical analysis have been done independently. The model is
often built in an abstract context, with ad hoc specification used for most of the empirical
testing. This study develops a theoretical model, which describes the characteristics of the
electricity generation industry. In particular, the different roles of the flow and stock of
emissions is recognized. During the process of electricity generation, the flow of
emissions is generated at firm level, while the accumulation of its stock is defined as a
disutility factor in social welfare. Also, the firm’s optimization choice is represented as a
cost-minimization problem as opposed to profit maximization, reflecting the semiregulated nature of China’s power industry. In addition, the empirical analysis is

6
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/26/AR2008082603096.html.
BBC News, November 26, 2009.
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connected with theoretical modeling through the optimal conditions derived directly from
the model, which are used to examine and compute the policy instrument for emissions
control.
The paper will be organized as follows: Section 2 presents a model describing
China’s regulated power generation sector. Both the social and private problems are
examined to determine if the social goal can be achieved under appropriate policy
instruments. We derive the emission fee that is required to achieve balanced growth,
where the stock of emissions is stabilized and growth of desired output is non-negative.
Section 3 develops the empirical analysis using the derived conditions from the analytical
model. Provincial level power sector data from China is used to compute the optimal tax
rate that allows sustainable growth. The Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
method is employed to estimate the joint production function. The estimated production
parameters, derived optimal conditions, and data from the China Power Electric
Yearbook are used to compute the emission tax. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of
the major findings from the theoretical and empirical analyses, the implications for policy
choice that accommodate the balanced growth between emissions control and electricity
generation, and the limitations corresponding to global emissions control.

2. Model
The purpose of this study is to provide insight on the potential for carbon
emission control in the absence of an effective international agreement. The question we
will answer is whether sustainable economic growth can be achieved under appropriate
carbon regulation tools.
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2.1 Joint Production Model
To provide tractable analytical results, a Cobb-Douglas production function is
used to describe the process of power generation, where the desired and undesired
outputs (i.e., electricity and emissions) are jointly produced. A modified Hamiltonian
approach is employed to solve for the social and private optimum when production and
emissions abatement are decided simultaneously. The modeling set-up is developed to
capture the most important characteristics of the electricity generation sector in China,
where the price of electricity is regulated and input markets are relatively competitive.
Therefore, the optimization problem is described as utility maximization for social
planner and cost minimization for private firms.
The Cobb-Douglas joint production function is defined as following:

Y = F ( K 1 , X ) = A a [ K1 ]α [ X ]α '
E = G ( K 1 , K 2 , X ) = A b [ K 1 ] β [ X ] β ' e − K 2γ

(1),

where electricity Y and carbon emissions E are jointly produced using inputs of capital
investment K1, K2, and fossil fuel X. Fuel consumption X is measured in units of standard
coal, a measure that combines information on the three major fossil fuels (coal, oil fuel,
and gas) used in electricity generation. Two types of capital are used to reflect investment
in alternative methods of emission reduction: improved energy efficiency and end of the
pipe treatment. K1 represents investment in production efficiency that can reduce
emissions per unit of electricity generated, while K2 is investment in capture and storage
technology that allows for abating emission after generation. The major parameters in
this joint function include: A represents the technology used in electricity generation; α
and β are associated with marginal productivity of capital K1 in the production of output
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and emissions, respectively; and γ is the abatement efficiency rate of removing emission
flows after electricity generation. The Cobb-Douglas function implies that the marginal
productivity

of

K1

for

both

outputs

is

positive,

i.e.

Y1 = ∂Y (.) / ∂K1 > 0

and E1 = ∂E (.) / ∂K1 > 0 . We also assume that the marginal productivity of K2 in emissions
is negative, or that E 2 = ∂E (.) / ∂K 2 < 0 .
Estimation of a production function is central to a large body of empirical analysis
in economics, especially for measurement of technological efficiency. The Cobb-Douglas
function, first proposed by Cobb-Douglas in 1927-1928, has been widely used due to its
simple structure. The commonly used least square method8 suffers from the problems
caused by data aggregation or data used in estimation are in monetary values. The major
concern in this literature is the possible endogeneity bias as a result of correlation
between input factor and error term.9 Instrumental variable (IV) estimator is the main
approach used to deal with bias in the presence of such correlation.
For estimating a production function using firm-level panel data, Olley and Pakes
(1996) showed under certain assumptions, investment can be used as a proxy variable for
unobserved time-varying productivity. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) proposed a
modification of Olley and Parks approach to address the problem of lumpy investment,
suggesting using intermediate inputs to proxy for unobserved productivity. Felipe et al
(2008) argued that the endogeneity problem is simply the result of omitted variable bias
due to poor approximation to an accounting identity, and they believe that the problem
has no econometric solution. They question the recent attempts to solve such problem by

8

Examples: Bronfenbrenner and Douglas (1939) at JPolitEcon 47:761-785; Douglas and Gunn (1941) at
AER. 31: 67-80; Douglas, Daly and Olson (1943) at JPolitEcon 51:61-65.
9
See details in Marschak and Andrew (1944) at Econometrica 12: 143-205.
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developing new estimators, and showed that the only possible way to estimate
technological productivity of production function is by using physical quantities instead
of expenditures.
Our work differs from previous studies when using production function
estimation in several ways: 1) we use measures based on physical quantities, which might
reduce the problems associated with the major concerns discussed in previous literature;
2) we test for possible correlation within each equation and across two equations; 3) we
are interested in determining the optimal emission tax that would allow non-negative
production growth in this set up, not in measuring the productivity. We find insignificant
correlation between inputs and the error term for each equation, and slightly significant
correlation between the two error terms across the two equations, which provides
justification for estimating the two equations simultaneously.
The major assumptions used in this study are: (i) emissions and electricity
production can be represented using a Cobb-Douglas joint-production function; (ii)
abatement activities are narrowed down to two choices: (ii-1) reducing emissions through
improvements in production efficiency due to substitution between productive capital and
standard coal inputs; (ii-2) investing in abatement capital to build capture and storage
facilities; (iii) the stock of emissions is a disutility factor in the social welfare function.
We model carbon emissions generated in the current time period as a flow of pollution,
the stock of which has a natural decay rate.

2.1 Social Problem
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The social planner is assumed to maximize the discounted value of social welfare
in continuous time, which is defined in a utility function of production net value (V) and
pollution stock (S), subject to constraints on production technology and the absorptive
capacity of the environment. The marginal utility of private good consumption (here
represented by the production net value) is positive, and marginal utility of pollution is
negative. These conditions are represented by the following:
U 1= ∂U (.) / ∂V > 0

(2)

U 2= ∂U (.) / ∂S < 0

The social planner’s problem is to maximize the discounted value of utility over time,
where ρ0 is the social discount rate,
(3) Max ∫ U (V , S )e − ρ0t dt
{ X , I1 , I 2 }

(4)

(5)

Y = AK1α X α '
E = K1β X β 'e − K 2γ

K 1 = I 1 − δ K 1
K 2 = I 2 − δ K 2

Subject to

Joint production function

Capital accumulation

(6)

S = E − ζ S

Equation of motion for emissions stock

(7)

V = Y − I 1 − I 2 − WX

Production net value.

Where δ is the depreciation rate of capital, ζ is the natural decay rate of the stock of
carbon emissions, S is the stock of emission; W is the real price of input in term of
production value. The choice variables are investment on production I 1 , investment on
abatement I 2 and coal inputs X, while the state variables are productive capital K1 ,
abatement capital K 2 and emissions stock S. V is the net value of production, where the
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price of output is normalized to one. The current value of Hamiltonian problem can be
written as:
(8) H c = U (V , S ) + λs1 ( I1 − δ K1 ) + λs 2 ( I 2 − δ K 2 ) + λ s 3 ( E − ζ S )

,

where λs1 , λs 2 , λs 3 are the co-state variable of state variables K1 , K 2 , S , and represent the
shadow value of productive capital, abatement capital, and pollution stock respectively.
The s subscript refers to the social optimum. Since pollution is a bad, its shadow value is
negative, i.e. λs 3 < 0 . Solving Equation (8) gives the following necessary conditions:
(9)

HXc =

∂H
= U1 (YX − W ) + λs 3 E
∂X

(10)

H I 1c =

∂H
∂V
= U1
+ λs1 = 0 ⇒ U1 = λs1
∂I1
∂I1

(11)

H I 2c =

∂H
∂V
= U1
+ λs 2 = 0 ⇒ U1 = λs 2
∂I 2
∂I 2

X

=0

Equation (9) sets the rule for the socially optimal choice of coal inputs, where the social
benefit of using coal equals its social cost, i.e. market price plus the environmental cost of
using coal. The environmental cost is the disutility due to the environmental damage of
emissions, i.e. U1YX = U1W − λs 3 E X . Without regulation, the optimal private choice of
coal inputs would be set at the point where the marginal benefit of using coal is equal to
its market price only. This corresponds to a market outcome where the shadow value of
emission is zero, i.e. λs 3 = 0 . Equations (10) and (11) set the rule for optimal social
investment, i.e. U1 = λs1 = λs 2 , where the marginal utility of private goods equals to the
shadow value of investment for both production and abatement. The optimal investment
*

*

I1 and I 2 cannot be solved directly without specification of utility function.
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2.2

Private Firm Problem
The private problem is examined under the emission tax, which will be imposed

on the flow generated at the firm level when emissions exceed the socially optimal level.
To achieve the social optimum, the optimal tax rate will be derived by comparing the
first-order conditions of the private problem under an emissions tax with those of social
problem. In the context of China’s electricity generation sector, economic reform of
output markets was proposed in 2003, but due to various reasons, it has never taken effect.
Therefore, the optimization problem for firms is described as a cost minimization
problem, since the electricity price is regulated in China while input markets are
competitive.
Without regulation firms have no incentive to internalize the social cost of
emissions (its negative impact on the environment) into their production decision. They
choose to set Y X *( private ) = W , a rule that sets the marginal private benefit equal to the
marginal private cost. Under regulation, firms have to reset the production plan upon the
rule

deviated

from

the

socially

optimal

condition

on

input

X,

where U1W − λs 3 E X = U1YX *( social ) . Since λs 3 < 0 , the firm will use more coal inputs (X)
under

the

private

optimum

than

that

under

social

problem,

i.e.,

X * ( social ) < X * ( private) . With no regulation, firms have no incentive to invest in
abatement capital ( K 2 = 0 and K = K1 ). Moreover, we show in the next section that final
production of both the desired output Y and the undesired emission E would exceed the
social optimal levels without regulation. Therefore, government intervention is necessary.
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A simple and direct tool is to impose a unit fee (τ) on individual firm emissions E
when it exceeds the optimal level E * in order to achieve the socially optimal outcome and
require firms to internalize the external cost of emissions. While much of the previous
literature imposes a tax on all emissions, Holterman (1976) shows that setting the tax on
all emissions or only on emissions above the socially optimal level achieve the same
result.
In the long run at a steady state, the optimal level of aggregate emissions for
private firms could be defined as E * = S *ξ . The feasibility of this policy tool relies on the
assumption that emissions can be detected and measured by an inspection agent, and that
the fine associated with non-compliance is large enough to induce compliant behavior by
firms. Therefore, the corresponding private problem can be described as firms
minimizing the discounted value of total cost subject to current production technology,
and the long-run policy goal of stabilized emission stock levels as follows:
(12)

∞

Minimize COST ( X , K , I | Y , E ) = ∫ e− ρ t (WX + I1 + I 2 + τ ( E − E*)dt
0

Subject to

(13.1)

(13.2)

Y = AK1α X α ' ≥ Y0
E = K1β X β 'e − K2γ

K 1 = I 1 − δ K 1
K 2 = I 2 − δ K 2

(13.3) E * = ξ S *

Joint production

Capital accumulation

Socially optimal emission flow,

where the notation is the same as that in social problem in Section 2.1.
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The constrained cost minimization problem is reformulated as an unconstrained
problem by maximizing the negative cost (Wossink and Swinton 2007). The current
value Hamiltonian function is stated as follows:
(14)

H c = −(WX + I1 + I 2 + τ ( E − E * )) + λp1 (I1 − δ K1 )
+ λp2 (I 2 − δ K 2 ) + λ p 3 ( AK1α X α ' − Y0 )

,

where λ p1 is the shadow value of productive capital K1 , λ p 2 is the shadow value of
abatement capital K 2 ; λ p 3 is the shadow value of desired output Y; emission flow E and
electricity output Y are two jointly produced outputs. The p subscript refers to the private
optimization problem. Assuming that appropriate conditions that guarantee the existence
of solutions are satisfied, we differentiate Equation (14) with respect to the choice and
state variables to obtain conditions for optimality:

(15)

∂H C
∂E (.)
∂Y (.)
= −W − τ
+ λ p3
= 0 ⇒ W + τ Ex = λ p 3YX
∂X
∂X
∂X
Equation (15) describes the rule for the optimal choice of coal inputs for

electricity producers: when the marginal private benefit of using coal is equal to its
market price plus the tax. When there is no regulation (τ = 0 ), the marginal production of
coal X is less than that when there is regulation ( τ > 0 ). Letting the superscript UR
denotes the unrestricted outcome and R denotes the restricted (with tax) outcome, this
conclusion follows because λ p 3YXUR = W and λ p 3YxR = W + τ E X or that Y XUR < YxR .
Since Y XX < 0 , it follows that Y UR > Y R , and that the output produced under no regulation
will be greater than under the emission regulation.
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(16)

∂H C
= −1 + λ p1 = 0 ⇒ λ p1 = 1
∂I1

(17)

∂H C
= −1 + λ p 2 = 0 ⇒ λ p 2 = 1
∂I 2
Equations (16) - (17) set the conditions for optimal investment in both productive

and abatement capital, and show that the shadow value of each type of capital is constant
and equal.
Equations (18) – (19) show the condition for the growth rate of the co-state
variables, which are zero at an optimal steady state:

(18)

λp1
τ EK 1 − λ p 3YK 1
= ρ +δ +
=0
λ p1
λ p1

(19)

λp 2
τE
= ρ +δ + K2 = 0
λp2
λp2
Reorganizing equation (19) and using the emission function defined in equation

(13.3) will give the marginal emission reduction of abatement capital,
(20)

EK 2 = −( ρ + δ ) / τ = −γ K1β X β ′e − K 2γ = −γ E .

We can use this to solve for the optimal level of emission flow at a steady state for a
private producer:
(21)

E * private = ( ρ + δ ) / τγ ,

which will be equal to the socially optimal emission flow as long as the tax rate is set
according to the following condition:
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(22)

When

τ* =

ρ +δ
S *ζ γ

the

.

social

constraint

is

binding

in

the

private

problem,

E * private = ( ρ + δ ) / τγ = E *social = S *ξ solves for optimal tax rate. While the functional

form in Equation (22) cannot be used for our empirical analysis, it is useful for providing
an economic interpretation of the optimal outcome. For instance, a higher efficiency rate
for abatement technology (γ) reduces the necessary emission tax. This is because lower
investment in abatement capital is necessary to achieve emission reductions. A higher
individual discount rate (ρ) requires a higher emission tax, since an individual has little
motivation to reduce emissions in the absence of regulation. A lower level of emission
stock at the social optimal (S*), or a lower of absorptive capability (ξ) of atmosphere
requires a higher tax rate to control the emission. That is because achieving a socially
optimal level of emission stock that is low requires a larger amount of emission flows to
be removed; and a lower absorptive capacity of the atmosphere accelerates the
accumulation of emissions, which requires a higher tax to stabilize.
Because the shadow value of each type of capital is a constant, the growth rate of
capital will be zero. As a result, Equation (18) and (19) are equal at the steady state, and
we can derive the relationship between marginal value of production capital and
abatement capital as following:
(23)

λ p 3YK 1 − τ EK 1 = −τ EK 2

Equation (23) implies that the marginal net value of production capital to the firm is
equal to the marginal social benefit of abatement capital at the optimum, where
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production capital plays the roles in both generation of desired output and emission. The
left-hand side of the equation shows the two impacts of increasing productive capital (K1).
On one hand, an increase in K1 increases the desired outputs that bring firms the benefit
from output value. On the other hand, it also increases the undesired emissions, which
firms have to pay for through the tax.
Expanding Equation (23) with the parameters from Equation (1) gives the following,

λ p 3 Aα K1(α −1) X α ' − τβ K1( β −1) X β 'e − K γ = τγ K1β X β 'e− K γ , which can be solved to get the
2

2

optimal ratio of emissions to output,

(24)

αλ p 3
E
( )* =
,
Y
τ ( β + γ K1 )

where λ p 3 =

w + τ EX
from equation (15). Equation (24) provides the theoretical basis to
YX

show that further emissions reduction can be achieved without cutting back the
production of desired output. In the case of emission control, this ratio is referred to as
the emission factor. Much of the previous literature which models endogenous growth
assumes that emissions are proportional to the final production (e.g., Van der Ploeg and
Withagen 1991, Michel and Rotillon 1995) or the emission per unit of output is a
constant. Others model the pollution process as a function of technological progress in
abatement (Brock and Taylor 2004), production technology (Stokey 1998), and
abatement knowledge accumulation (Xepapadeas 1997).
One main result from previous work, which assumes a fixed emissions factor,
implies that the only way to reduce emissions is to reduce production. In this study,
modeling a joint production function without assuming a fixed emissions factor opens the
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possibility that the abatement of pollution (hereto emissions) does not necessarily require
cutting back production (hereto power generation). Using a joint production function in
the model rather than a single production function or the assumption that pollution is
proportional to output (ex. Michel and Rotillon 1995), we find that the emission factor is
a function of production capital. Previous research that used single production function
often treat pollution as an input in the economic model. The main concerns about using a
single production function are: a) emissions are a byproduct of electricity generation,
therefore the use of single production function in modeling is inconsistent with the power
generation process; b) the underlying assumption of using a single production function is
that the emissions are a fixed proportion of electricity. Our framework allows us to test
for this result, but does not assume that it holds. The theoretical findings in our study
(Equation 24) suggest that several factors could change the ratio of emissions to
electricity, and provide insight into the feasibility of emission reduction without slowing
economic development. Either improving production efficiency from investment in K1, or
abatement investment in K2 could change the emissions per unit of output, implying that
emission abatement is compatible with economic development under circumstances.
These findings can be used as a theoretical base for identifying under what circumstances
environmental protection is compatible with continuing economic growth.
Rewriting equation (24) to solve for optimal emission tax as:
(25) τ * =

αXW
E (α ' ( β + γK 1 ) − αβ ' )

19
Comparing the optimal conditions in the private and social problems for demand for coal

X, we can also derive the optimal emission tax that allows achieving the social optimal
conditions in term of utility function:
YX −

λs 3 E X

= λ p 3YX − τ E X

U1

⇒ τ * = (λ p 3 − 1)

where λ p 3 =

YX λs 3
+
E X U1

τ ( E1 − E2 )
Y1

and λs 3 =

U2
ρ0 + ζ − g (λs 3 )

Reorganizing the term will get the emission tax that is connected with social utility
function:
(26) τ * = (

α 'Y U 1
−
) /( M − 1)
β'E U2L

where L = ρ0 + ζ − g (λs 3 ) > 0 and M =

( β + γ K1 )α '
> 1 . Theoretically, Equations (25)
αβ '

and (26) are equivalent. Due to data availability, Equation (25) will be used for
computation of policy rate in empirical analysis in section 3.2.
2.3

Comparative Static Analysis

In this section we will examine the effect of changes in various parameters on the
emission tax policy. For example, we show how an increase or decrease in the discount
or depreciation rate affects the optimal tax rate. This could be important in determining
the impact of technological improvements that increase the life of capital or a shift in
perceptions about the relative importance of current generations versus future generations.
2.3.1

Optimal emission tax rate
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Equation (22) defines the emission tax rate when the private optimal emission
flow equals to the social level. The signs of its derivative will tell the impact of different
factors on the emission tax. Examining the discount and depreciation rates shows
that

∂τ *
1
= * > 0 , suggesting that as the private discount rate and depreciation
∂ ( ρ + δ ) S ζγ

rate increases, the tax rate should increase as well. This is because a high discount rate
means that an individual places a greater value on current consumption or production
compared to the future. Letting D = α ' ( β + γK 1 ) − αβ ' , we show that the derivative of Eq.
(P14)
that

with

respect

to

productive

capital

K1,

is

negative,

or

αXW
αXW
∂τ *
α 'γ +
=
E1 < 0 . This indicates that when the efficiency of
2
∂K 1 E (− D )
D(− E 2 )

production technology increases, a lower tax rate is required for stabilizing the emission
stock. The derivative of Equation (26) with respect to the social discount rate,
−U 2
∂τ * 1
=
> 0 suggests the higher social discount rate in the utility
∂ρ0 U1 ( ρ0 + ζ − g (λs 3 )) 2

function would stimulate more consumption and production, which in turn generates
more emissions, and requires a higher emission tax rate to stabilize the stock of emissions.
In

considering

the

impact

of

abatement

technology

efficiency,

we

find

∂τ *
(ρ + δ )
that
= − * 2 < 0 , implying that more efficient abatement technology, the lower
∂γ
S ζγ

tax rate is required. Similarly,

∂τ *
(ρ + δ )
= − * 2 < 0 means that the higher natural
∂ζ
S ζ γ

dissipating rate of emission stock, then a lower tax rate is needed to stabilize the stock.
2.3.2

Optimal emission factor
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Equation (13) defines the relationship between two joint outputs at the optimum. Taking
the derivative of Equation (13) with respect to corresponding variables gives the impact

αλ p 3γ
∂ ( E / Y )*
and direction of each variable on the ratio. For instance,
=−
< 0,
∂K1
τ ( β + γ K1 ) 2
suggesting that increasing in productive capital K1 would lower the ratio, which explains
the mechanism of reduced emission/output ratio through cleaner production technology.
The impact of a change in the tax rate can be examined by looking at

αλ p 3
∂ ( E / Y )*
=− 2
< 0 , which might be explained by firms’ incentive to reduce
∂τ
τ ( β + γ K1 )
the emission from capture and storage under higher emission tax rates. In considering the
possibility of investment in pollution abatement technology, we find

αλ p 3 K1
∂ ( E / Y )*
that
=−
< 0 , meaning that the higher of abatement efficiency on
∂γ
τ ( β + γ K1 )2
capture and storage, the second possible way of abatement, the lower the ratio. One
somewhat surprising result is the impact of changes in α , the share of K1 in the
production function. We find that

λ p 3 K1
∂ ( E / Y )*
=
> 0 , meaning that a larger share
τ ( β + γ K1 )
∂α

of K1 in production function will increase the ratio. This result might be due to the fact
that the growth of the desired output is lower than the growth in emissions when the share
of capital in the production function increases. In considering the emissions generation
function, we find that

αλ p 3
∂ ( E / Y )*
=−
< 0 indicating that β , the share of K1 in
∂β
τ ( β + γ K1 ) 2

emission function will reduce the ratio. This suggests that the role of productive capital in
the emission function is to improve the efficiency by slowing down the growth of
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emission relative to that of desired output, which in turn to lowers the emission per unit
of output.

3. Empirical Analysis

The data from China Statistical Yearbook and China Electric Power Yearbook of
the time period 1993-2003 was selected for empirical analysis. The power industry
information covers 26 provinces and 4 municipalities. Variables used for calculating the
emission tax rate include final output Y, the total electricity generated for the current year
by each province, measured in 100 million kWh; three major fuel inputs X (coal, oil, and
gas) consumption are measured in 10 thousands tons; K is the electricity generation
capacity measured in million Yuan of current year, representing the stock of production
capital; and byproduct emission E is measured in million tons of carbon10 by converting
fossil fuel consumption into carbon emission using the corresponding emission factor,
which is defined by China Development and Reform Committee (2007)11. The summary
statistics are presented in Table 1.
The data includes a total of 326 observations12 of 30 provinces and municipalities
for an 11-year period. This has been used to estimate the joint production functions and
examine the relationship between the undesired output E (carbon emissions) and desired
output Y (electricity generation). Since the emissions and electricity are jointly produced,
estimation of these two production functions requires the use of simultaneous equation

10

E=COAL*2.11 (ton co2/ton coal) + OIL*3.06 (ton co2/ton oil)+GAS*2.19 (ton co2/1000m3 gas)
http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CDM/UpFile/File1364.pdf and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) 2007 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.
12
Due to the missing values in several variables, Xizhang Province in the year of 1998 is not use for
estimation.
11
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techniques, as the error term in each equation is likely to be correlated. We use Full
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) to take care of possible correlation problem in
a system of nonlinear equations. This method is analogous to the linear equation method
of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). In addition, as no appropriate data is
available to represent the technology A, the production function will be estimated without
α

a technology term as follows:

Y = b1 K 1 X α '
β

E = b2 K 1 X β '

, where b1 and b2 are the multipliers that

correct for the potential econometric problem of heterogeneity across provinces.
Therefore, implementing the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method
provides estimates that are efficient and asymptotically consistent.
3.1 Estimation of Joint Production Function

The estimation results are shown in Table 2. When no abatement activity is
included

(K2=0),

the

Y = 0.211K10.0989 X 0.942
E = 0.0498 K1−0.0395 X 0.966

joint

production

function

could

be

described

as

. We test for correlation between the explanatory variables and

the error term in each equation using the Pearson method. The results are reported in the
Table 3. The results from the Pearson test suggest that the FIML method is appropriate
for getting consistent and approximately efficient estimation, since the correlation
between the error terms across the two equations is statistically significant at the 5% level,
while the correlations between the explanatory variable and error term within each
equation are insignificant. We test the joint production function for constant returns to
scale, and the results are shown in Table 4. We find that technology does not exhibit the
constant returns to scale in both capital and coal factor inputs in the joint production of
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electricity and emission. Therefore, the general structure of Cobb-Douglas is appropriate
for fitting the data.
The results from the estimation of the joint production functions have three
important implications: (i) the input coal (X) is the primary input in the joint production;
(ii) productive capital (K1) plays a small role in the electricity generation process,
compared to that of input coal; (iii) the productive capital intends to reduce the marginal
productivity of emission. The second implication is consistent with the reality that power
generation technology is mature and capital investments are gradually switching from the
stage of power generation to the stages of power distribution and transmission network
(often referred to ‘grid’) construction. The third implication reflects the fact that Chinese
power generation heavily relies on the coal consumption, while the coal-fired power
plants provided 81.5 percent of electric supply (China National Statistical Bureau 2007).
3.2 Computation of Optimal Emission Tax

The derived condition in equation (25) defines the optimal tax rate for emission
control. Using the estimated parameters from the joint production function and derived
conditions at balanced growth from the model, we compute the optimal emission tax rate

τ under different levels of abatement efficiency γ . The IPCC (2005) 13 report suggests
that the current post-combustion and pre-combustion systems for power plants could
capture 85–95 percent of the CO2 in theory. However, the physical absorption technique
for CO2 removal is not suitable for application to exhaust gas from power plants having
relatively low concentration (10 percent or less) of CO2. Higher capture efficiencies are
possible, although separation and purification are energy intensive activities. Currently

13

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_wholereport.pdf
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available methods for capture and compression technology require approximately 10–40
percent more energy than the equivalent generation level without capture. As capture and
storage (CCS) has not yet been applied to large (above 500 MW) fossil fuel power plants,
the overall system results may be different than with initial results in smaller plants.
Considering the uncertainty of abatement technology adoption and heterogeneity of
power plants in production efficiency, we consider a range of abatement efficiency rates
( γ ) from 10 to 100 percent in calculating the optimal emission tax.
The results shown in Table 5 are consistent with the comparative analysis
discussed in Section 2.3, where the emission tax rate is decreasing as the abatement
efficiency improves. The calculation shows that the tax is 16.16 yuan per ton of
emissions when the ability to remove carbon emissions is as low as γ = 10% . The
emission tax could be reduced dramatically to 5.35 yuan per ton, once the capability of
capture and storage has been increased to γ = 30% . In theory, if the abatement method
could remove all the emissions after its generation ( γ = 100% ), the required tax rate is
very small, 0.787 yuan per ton.

4. Discussion and Conclusion

Previous literature has shown that determining whether environmental
improvement is compatible with continued economic growth remains unclear and
requires further research in a specific context. Our case study focuses on one major
source of carbon emissions: the electricity generation sector in China (the biggest emitter
in the world according to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2007). Our
results provide policy implications for emissions control within the power sector of China,
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for cases when there is no international agreement or when an international agreement
allows individual countries to choose their preferred method to control carbon emissions.
A theoretical model is developed to describe a regulated sector in China, and a
modified Hamiltonian approach is used to demonstrate the optimal conditions that
accommodate the policy of emission control in a private context. The optimal conditions
derived from the model have been used to perform the empirical analysis. The theoretical
analysis suggests that firms have no incentive to abate in the absence of regulation,
because the market price of inputs does not incorporate the environmental cost of the
fossil fuel consumption (mainly referred to coal).
The theoretical model finds that the ratio of undesired output (emissions) to
desired output (electricity) for Chinese power generation is not a constant, but a function
of inputs and production parameters. The ratio would be affected by the quantity and
marginal productivity of productive capital, input coal prices, and the efficiency of
abatement capital. This variable relationship between power generation and its
byproducts (emissions) implies that there are multiple methods for further emission
mitigation: improvement of production efficiency through an increase in the stock of
productive capital, or improvement of the abatement efficiency.
The theoretical analysis suggests that the optimal emissions tax depends largely
on the efficiency of abatement technology: the higher the efficiency is, the lower the tax
is required to accomplish the goal. The empirical testing using the power sector data at
provincial level is consistent with the theoretical results. The required emission tax would
be reduced greatly from 16 to 5 yuan per ton of emission when the abatement technology
is improved from removing 10% to 30% of emissions flow.
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While the conclusions of this study are based on a single industry, results are
informative in comparing emission control policies for different nations. For example, a
nation with more efficient abatement technology would require a lower emission tax to
achieve stable pollution levels. However, there are some limitations to our results. This
study uses a partial equilibrium framework that looks at a single sector, while the stock of
pollutants generated locally from a variety of different sources often involve more than
one industrial sector. Therefore, the results do not consider the interaction across different
sectors. Other important factors, such as a change of energy structure, alternative energy
sources, energy intensity changes within national economy and international
cooperation/trade on abatement credit, also contribute to controlling the growth of
emissions stock. Secondly, the derived conditions used for the empirical analysis and
policy interpretation are at the steady state. Dynamic solutions, such as phase diagrams
could be useful for describing the evolution of state and control variables over time.
In summary, we find that environmental improvement is compatible with
economic development, as long as appropriate policy is chosen. The choice of emission
tax rates for emission control is determined by the productivity of capital, productivity of
coal and efficiency of abatement technology. The computation in this study suggests that
the optimal emission tax rate is moderate when abatement technology allows removing at
least 30% of newly generated emissions. The theoretical and empirical analysis in this
study could be used to understand other industries, nations, or stock pollutions when it
comes to the issue of how to achieve the social goal of stabilizing the pollution levels in
private context.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
YC

Definition
Electricity of fossil
fuel power

EC

X

Carbon emissions
from fossil fuel
consumption
Capacity of
generation
Standard coal

W

Price of coal

K1

Unit
100
million
kilowatt
hour
Million
tons of
CO2
10,000
kilowatt
10,000
tons
Yuan per
ton of coal

Mean
343.84

Std Dev
283.40

Minimum
15.17

28.69

1.18

139.72

735.83

590.58

33.85

3920.20

1265.93

1007.73

71.60

5037.69

143.28

14.70

120.26

180.89

Year between 1993~2003
Source: Various China Statistical Yearbook and China Power Electric Yearbook

Maximum
1449.20

30
α

Table 2: Joint Production Function ( K 2 = 0 )

Parameter

FIML Estimate

Approx.

YC = b1 K 1 XC α ' + ε 1
β

EC = b2 K 1 XC β ' + ε 2

P-value

Std Err
b1

0.211593 ***

0.00762

<0.0001

α

0.098873 ***

0.00909

0.0009

α'

0.941999 ***

0.00927

<0.0001

b2

0.049743***

0.00619

<0.0001

β

-0.0395

-0.0314

0.2092

β'

0.966443 ***

0.0349

<0.0001
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Table 3:

Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob>|r| under Ho: Rho=0

correlation

ε1

XC

ε2

K1

1

.02647

0.11150

0.03830

(0.6340)

(0.0442)**

(0.4907)

1

-0.04071

0.94794

(0.4638)

(<0.0001)***

1

-0.04261

(p-value)

ε1
XC

ε2

(0.4433)
K1
Total number of observations is 326
***, ** and * represents statistical significance at 1%, 5% level and 10% level

1
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Table 4: Hypothesis testing for joint production structure

Wald Test

Test

Pr>ChiSq

Conclusion

Statistics
Ho:

α + α'= 1

78.15

<0.0001

Reject the null,
Production function is not C.R.S

Ho:

β + β '= 1

21.27

<0.0001

Reject the null,
Emission function is not C.R.S
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Table 5: Computation of The Optimal Emission Tax Rate (τ)
Abatement

(a)

(b)

efficiency rate

Calculated

Calculated

(γ)

emission tax

emission tax

10%

16.15

16.10

20%

8.03

8.02

30%

5.34

5.33

40%

4.00

4.00

50%

3.20

3.20

60%

2.66

2.66

70%

2.28

2.28

80%

1.99

1.99

90%

1.77

1.77

100%

1.59

1.59

(a): tax is computed under estimated parameters αˆ = 0.0988, αˆ ' = 0.942, βˆ − 0.0395, βˆ ' = 0.966
(b): tax is computed under estimated parameters αˆ = 0.0988, αˆ ' = 0.942, βˆ = 0, βˆ ' = 0.966 ,
because the coefficient of βˆ is insignificant.

